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Conflict Resolution and Crime 
Surveillance in Kenya: Local Peace 
Committees and Nyumba Kumi
Eric Mutisya Kioko 
Abstract: In the wake of widespread interethnic “clashes” and al-Shabaab 
terrorist attacks in Kenya over the last few years, the state has embarked on 
the devolution of capacities for ensuring security and peace to the local 
level. The state gave the rights to handle specific local conflicts and crime 
prevention to local peace committees in an attempt to standardise an as-
pect of customary law, and to Nyumba Kumi committees in a strategy of 
anchoring community policing at the household level. These changes were 
conditioned and framed by ideas of decentralisation and the delegation of 
responsibilities from the state to the community level. In this paper, the 
following questions are raised: Are hybrid governance arrangements effec-
tive and appropriate? To what extent do peace committees and Nyumba 
Kumi provide institutional support for peaceful conflict management and 
crime prevention in Kenya? What guarantees and what constrains their 
success? The author draws on ethnographic data from the Maasai–Kikuyu 
borderlands near Lake Naivasha, a former hotspot of interethnic clashes. 
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“Security is a shared mandate of all people living in Kenya. The first 
rule of security is vigilance […] we must all embrace Nyumba Kumi.” 
(Uhuru Kenyatta, president of Kenya, 20 October 2013) 
 
“Let us not give criminals space to operate […] this will be achieved 
through the recently established Nyumba Kumi Initiative.” (Uhuru 
Kenyatta, president of Kenya, 20 October 2014) 
 
“This is a dispute between neighbours and can be handled at ‘home’ with 
the assistance of the local peace committee. There was no need for John [a 
Kikuyu farmer] to drive a hundred cattle [belonging to a Maasai herder] 
to the police station. He should have raised his complaint with his local 
peace committee first. We request you [police] to refer this matter back 
‘home’ so that we can try to resolve it there.” (Richard, local peace 
committee chair, Enoosupukia, March 2014) 
 
These statements capture Kenya’s recent adoption of a collaborative/par-
ticipatory approach to the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the preven-
tion of crime. This move came in the wake of widespread intercommunity 
violence,1 rising crime rates,2 and the al-Shabaab terrorist attacks in Kenya, 
including the Westgate Shopping Mall attack (see Anderson and McKnight 
2014). In the last decade, the state has created neo-traditional institutions 
at the community level that were (superficially) shaped after social institu-
tions deemed to be traditional. Local peace committees (LPC) took shape 
mainly after the atrocities committed during the 2007–2008 post-election 
violence. The state created Nyumba Kumi (NK), a community policing 
(CP)3 initiative, about four years later. While LPCs are meant to solve local 
conflicts through arbitration, Nyumba Kumi committees (NKC) are 
thought of as measures for local surveillance. The two are therefore dis-
tinct manifestations of government attempts to harness local, informal 
practices of conflict/dispute management and crime prevention/surveil-
lance as part of hybrid systems with the formal security sector. However, 
as shown in this paper, the mandates of the LPCs and NKCs at the local 
level are becoming increasingly conflated. LPCs are  
1  The land question, ethnocentrism, and politics are the major causes of ethnic 
violence in Kenya (Oucho 2002). 
2  The Kenya 2015 Crime and Safety Report notes that crime rates are at a critical 
level (see OSAC 2015). 
3  Community policing is a policing philosophy that promotes organisational 
strategies that support the systemic use of partnerships between communities 
and government policing agencies, and problem-solving techniques to proac-
tively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues 
such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime (Republic of Kenya 2015). 
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peace architectures bringing together traditional dispute resolution 
mechanisms involving traditional elders, women, religious leaders 
and NGO initiatives on the one hand and formal mechanisms for 
conflict resolution including those by government administrative 
and security agencies on the other. (Republic of Kenya 2011: 46)  
Nyumba Kumi is a Swahili phrase roughly translated as “10 households.” 
It is a strategy of anchoring CP at the household level (Republic of Kenya 
2015: 2). LPCs and NKCs are therefore intended to bring together syn-
ergies between state and non-state actors, institutions, and organisations in 
conflict management and crime prevention. This article is developed 
around the question of how and whether hybrid governance arrangements 
are effective and appropriate.4 
Hybrid Governance Arrangements in Conflict 
Resolution and Crime Prevention 
Colona and Jaffe (2016: 1) define hybrid governance arrangements as 
those in which non-state actors take on functions classically attributed to 
the state and, in the process, become entangled with formal state actors 
and agencies to the extent that it is difficult to make a clear distinction 
between state and non-state. The governance actors, they argue, become 
co-rulers, sharing control over territories and populations. Hybrid gov-
ernance arrangements are gaining popularity in development debates, 
particularly in the governance of (common-pool) resources, and in peace-
building/conflict resolution. In the governance of natural resources, hybrid 
systems resemble the concept and principle of co-management, which is, 
according to the International Union for Conservation of Nature, 
a partnership in which government agencies, local communities 
and resource users, non-governmental organisations and other 
stakeholders negotiate, as appropriate to each context, the author-
ity and responsibility for the management of a specific area or set 
of resources. (International Union for Conservation of Nature 
1996; see also Carlsson and Berkes 2005: 66)  
Hybrid governance arrangements are also hailed as bringing a new ap-
proach to conflict management and peace-building (see Adam, Ver-
brugge, and Vanden Boer 2014; Castro and Nielsen 2001; Lederach 
1997; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2011). Adam, Verbrugge, and 
4  The author thanks Prof. Dr. Michael Bollig for his valuable comments on earlier 
drafts.  
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Vanden Boer propose that the combination of formal and informal in-
stitutions and strategies (mixed systems)  
aims to allow the different systems to draw strength from one an-
other, strengthen the conflict resolution process, reduce violence, 
and eventually draw the informal working systems into the ambit 
of mainstream formal governance structures. (Adam, Verbrugge, 
and Vanden Boer 2014: 3)  
Moreover, the development world perceives hybrid governance arrange-
ments as a prerequisite for sustainable development and enduring peace-
ful interactions (World Bank 2011; DFID 2010: 21).  
Despite the overwhelming weight on hybrid governance arrange-
ments, pertinent concerns, including those relating to their effectiveness, 
still exist. Colona and Jaffe (2016: 5) note that the seemingly bounded 
governance actors (“NGOs” and “corporations”) may not themselves be 
homogeneous either, assembling different interests and sources of au-
thority at any given time. They add that, although the concept of hybridity 
seeks to overcome the state/non-state dualism, its focus on the interac-
tions between different “state” and “non-state” authorities may inadvert-
ently reinforce this same distinction and illusion of boundedness. Further, 
they emphasise that the shift from a normative emphasis on “good 
governance” to pragmatic “arrangements that work,” and the associated 
assumption that “local” non-state actors are always legitimate, risk sus-
pending ethical assessments. The implicated cooperative framework (syn-
ergy) between actors, institutions, and strategies may not always work. It 
may increase problems of legitimacy, power differences, bureaucracy, and 
possible clashes between formal law and informal rules. Richmond (2010) 
draws attention to these power relations, noting not only the failure to 
recognise local capacity, agency, and resistance, but also local elite co-
option reminiscent of contemporary state-building practice. In reality, the 
proposed formal–informal institutional synergy may marginalise non-state 
actors in local environments. 
In the Kenyan context, LPCs came in the wake of legitimate con-
cerns. Land claims are increasingly politicised, and some “tribes” control 
and negotiate resources using guns (Mkutu 2008). Devolution is already 
shaping new layers of violent conflict, particularly where boundaries and 
natural resources (including oil) are politicised and contested (Greiner 
2013: 225–234). Land grabbing and commoditisation, the rapid transfor-
mation of property rights, and changes in land-use patterns (Lesogorol 
2008) compound Kenya’s emotive land question. Regarding CP, previ-
ous experiments in Nairobi and its environs did not produce desirable 
results (see Ruteere and Pommerolle 2003). Police booths in Nairobi, 
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which were meant to restore public confidence in the police force and to 
bring security closer to the citizens, have been used as either unofficial 
urinals or money-collection points by touts.5 Rampant corruption, illegal 
detentions, and the mistreatment of ordinary people by the police, as 
well as extrajudicial killings, have deepened mistrust between the police 
and the public (see Ruteere 1998). These complex problems compound 
local situations, begging the question of the role of LPCs and NKCs in 
such complicated matters.  
The main idea in this paper is to describe LPCs and NKCs as part 
of hybrid systems alongside Kenya’s formal security sector, and as part 
of the devolved peace and security framework. The main arguments are: 
1. LPCs and NKCs provide some hope for resolving local-level dis-
putes through the application of local norms and values. However, 
the root causes of violent conflicts including historical injustices, 
land grabbing, and the politicisation of land and ethnic categories 
(see Kanyinga 2009), may undermine the effectiveness of these in-
stitutions.  
2. Kenya’s endemic problem of corruption is increasingly finding its way 
into hybrid security and peace-building arrangements, and could ar-
guably perpetuate crime and insecurity.  
3. Formal laws often clash with informal rules in the definition of crimes 
and prescription of settlements.  
4. Dispute resolution usually attracts transaction costs (money and 
time). These are higher when disputants use formal mechanisms (po-
lice, chiefs, and the courts) and relatively low when they record com-
plaints with LPCs and NKCs.  
5. These institutions are vulnerable to political manipulation and could 
be used for political mobilisation at the community level.  
Before exploring the ethnography of LPCs and NKCs, the methods 
adopted for this study and the background of the study area are pre-
sented briefly. 
Methods
The study relied on ethnographic data collected in 2014 and 2015 at the 
borderlands of Maiella Sub-location, Nakuru County, and Enoosupukia 
Location, Narok County, on the fringes of the Lake Naivasha Basin (Fig-
ure 1). Fieldwork took place in six villages: the three villages located in the 
5  Standard Digital, City Security Booths Turned into Toilet Banks, 24 February 2016. 
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Maiella Sub-location (Maiella Trading Centre, Kokoti, and Nkampani) 
house mainly members of Kikuyu descent, and the three villages in 
Enoosupukia (Mpeuti, Olosho lole Kaloi, and Ol tepesi le Parsimei) have a 
dominant Maa-speaking population. Based on the 2009 census, the six 
villages accommodate a combined population of roughly 5,000. 
A mixed-methods approach was necessary for the methodological 
design of this study. The choice of informants mostly relied on dispro-
portionate, stratified random sampling, considering the variables of age, 
gender, and ethnicity. Participant observation involved attending and 
recording dispute resolution proceedings in real time using voice record-
ers and by taking notes. Open-ended interviews were conducted with 
purposively sampled disputants to inform the study about ongoing dis-
putes and to monitor the disputes that had been resolved using LPCs 
and NKCs. A few informants participated in extended cases. To under-
stand the structure, organisation, and roles of the LPCs and NKCs, data 
collection relied on focus group discussions (FGDs). Three LPCs, each 
consisting of 11 members, were studied in Enoosupukia Location, while 
three NKCs, each consisting of seven members, were studied in Maiella 
Sub-location. Key informants (county government administrators, youth, 
and women leaders) enriched the data from the focus groups. Oral tes-
timonies and archival research (at Rhodes House, Oxford)6 provided data 
on Maasai–Kikuyu relationships to land.  
Land and Social Dynamics:
Maasai–Kikuyu Background
This section briefly describes the link between violent conflicts and spe-
cific social dynamics.  
The British colonial administration moved the Maasai from Laikipia 
to the southern reserve where the study area is located in 1911 and 1912. 
They subsequently leased the land in Laikipia to European ranchers 
(Hughes 2006). The southern reserve was vaguely perceived as Maasai 
territory, but according to colonial reports, it was mainly occupied by some 
foraging Dorobo communities.7 From around 1900 onwards, the admin-
istration also expropriated lands occupied by the Kikuyu in central Kenya 
and converted them into “White Highlands,” forcing thousands of Kikuyu 
6  These archives were moved to Weston Library in 2014. 
7  Rhodes House, Oxford/MSS.Afr.S.1409. Copy of Southern Masai Reserve 
District Political Record Book, December 1911. See Blackburn (1996) for details 
about the Dorobo.  
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to migrate elsewhere in search of land and somewhere to settle (Anderson 
2005). Many were looking to settle in agricultural lands that either were in 
fact or were perceived to be underutilised, such as the Rift Valley (Horns-
by 2012: 249).  
Figure 1. The Study Villages  
Source: Kioko 2016. 
Between 1904 and 1934, more than 150,000 Kikuyu migrated west from 
central Kenya owing to a lack of grazing, others moved due to the loss of 
land to settlers, while yet others sought to acquire livestock and capital as 
squatters and labourers in European farms (Anderson 2005: 21–25). 
Thousands established settlements and began cultivation on the east of the 
Mau Escarpment, at the Lake Naivasha Basin, and around Enoosupukia, 
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where they interacted with the Dorobo and other Maasai sections, includ-
ing the Purko, Loita, and Matapato, who occasionally accessed these lands 
for dry-season grazing.8  
Upon their arrival, the Dorobo transferred settlement and ownership 
rights to land to both the Kikuyu and the northern Maasai, mostly through 
barter (land for food/livestock), in the form of gifts and payment for culti-
vation labour, and through marriage arrangements during much of the 
twentieth century (Blackburn 1996). Dorobo elders in Enoosupukia noted 
that such transfers were largely informal, and only in a few instances were 
hand-written agreements produced as evidence of a transfer. Nowadays, 
the legitimacy of many such agreements is contested. 
On the Maiella side, between the early and mid-twentieth century, 
large commercial farms dominated. Specifically, the Maiella Estate, a 
large settler farm (16,338 acres), was run until 1964 by an Italian (known 
locally as Loska).9 After independence, the Italian sold Maiella farm to 
the Ng’ati Farmers’ Cooperative, a society made up of about 600 farmers 
mainly of Kikuyu descent, the majority of whom had laboured on the 
farm. They consolidated themselves and reached out to friends and fam-
ily in central Kenya to raise money to buy the farm, thereby recreating a 
large githaka10 (plural: ithaka). By creating ithaka elsewhere, the Kikuyu 
successfully colonised agricultural frontiers that were previously dedi-
cated to cattle grazing in the Rift Valley. The bids of some Maasai to 
purchase the land were ultimately unsuccessful.  
Violent Conflicts and Political Agency 
The sale of Maiella Estate to mainly Kikuyu members of the cooperative 
evoked highly emotional reactions from the Maasai, who from the mid-
1960s had begun to claim indigenous rights to the land. Periodic bouts 
of violent conflict pitted Kikuyu Ng’ati farmers against the Maasai (spe-
cifically the Keekonyokie of Nkampani village), starting around 1968.11 
These outbreaks of violence took the form of alternating retaliatory 
8  Rhodes House, Oxford/Micr. Afri./515/Maasai District Annual Report/1914-
1915/District Commissioner. Interview with Kikuyu elders in Maiella, June 2014. 
9  The colonial regime contracted Italians for infrastructural development (for in-
stance, road construction). Rhodes House, Oxford/Handing Over Report/Mr. 
A.D. Galton-Fenzi to Mr. R.A. Jeary/Narok District/March 1957. 
10  A system of land control characterised by immigration and the subsequent 
pattern of settlement with reference to genealogies of Kikuyu mbari (patriarchal 
kinship groups). 
11  Interview with John Ole Linti, a former councillor, December 2013.  
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attacks. The Maasai destroyed and burned houses and crop farms 
planted by the Kikuyu, or fed Kikuyu crops to their livestock. In return, 
the Kikuyu killed Maasai livestock and engaged Maasai in physical fights 
with machetes. The situation continued with varying intensity into the 
1990s (Hornsby 2012: 548). Between 1990 and 1992, Majimbo12 politics 
ushered in a politicisation of land and ethnic categories in the Rift Valley. 
This culminated in a period of massive violence in the study area in Oc-
tober 1993, in which more than 20 Kikuyu farmers were killed and about 
10,000 were forcibly evicted from Enoosupukia at the instigation of local 
politicians (see Akiwumi 2001).  
The violence was perpetrated by an unofficial Maasai militia of hun-
dreds of morans,13 game wardens, and administration police assisted by a 
small core of local government officials,14 along with some residents, most 
of whom were eager to take back small parcels of land they had sold to 
Kikuyu farmers (Klopp 2001: 164; Hornsby 2012: 548). Internally dis-
placed Kikuyu from Enoosupukia pitched camp in a Catholic church in 
Maiella Trading Centre. In late 1994, government trucks transported most 
of them from Maiella and “dumped” them in Central Province (their per-
ceived ancestral land) under the cover of night (Hornsby 2012: 549; Klopp 
2001: 175). Hundreds rented houses in Maiella Trading Centre.  
Reinstating Peaceful Relations 
The situation is rather different today. Between 1995 and the early years of 
the twenty-first century, a great deal of time was spent preaching peace, 
reconciliation, and coexistence. The church (for example, the Catholic 
Mission in Maiella and Nakuru), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
the local administration (chiefs), and councils of elders from both sides 
spearheaded peace forums, which centred on intergroup dialogue. They 
brought together the youth, women, religious leaders, and elders from 
both groups. Trust between the Maasai and the Kikuyu began to take root 
in the early twenty-first century and has been characterised since by the 
collaborative use of natural resources and a diversity of crosscutting ties 
(see Kioko and Bollig 2015).  
Local elders and the courts began to resolve old and new land dis-
putes. The most famous dispute involved the Ng’ati Farmers’ Coopera-
12  Majimboism is a specific form of decentralisation/regionalism based on ethnic 
identity.  
13  Moran is a Maasai traditional warrior age-set. 
14  Daily Nation, Ntimama Vows to Evict “Aliens,” 13 September 1993, 3; Daily 
Nation, Outrage over More Killings,” 18 October 1993, 1–2. 
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tive against the Maasai who remained on Maiella Estate despite the trans-
fer of ownership rights from the Italian commercial farmer to the co-
operative. The case began in 1996 and lasted for almost 10 years, until 
the High Court ruled in favour of the Maasai, on the grounds of margin-
alisation and historical injustices. The court allowed the Maasai to be 
apportioned 4,027 acres out of the farm’s total 16,338 acres. The ruling 
ended a long-standing rivalry between the two groups.  
Nevertheless, disputes and conflicts form part of the social order in 
the study area. The disputes recorded during fieldwork included herder–
farmer cases, land ownership/sale disputes, land subdivision disputes, 
marital disputes, fights, slander, and trade-related disputes (for instance, 
livestock trade). Herder–farmer conflicts are common. There has been a 
massive reduction of grazing land due to agricultural intensification in 
the study area. Consequently, livestock movement is progressively re-
stricted and confined to narrow paths bordering the adjacent fenced 
crop farms of Maasai and non-Maasai farmers. In particular, herder–
farmer conflicts and tenure disputes contributed to the 1993 violence. 
The local administration (chiefs and police), LPCs, and NKCs success-
fully attended to most emerging disputes during the period of fieldwork 
(see case study), but some situations exceeded their mandate, including 
those that had been compounded by structural causes of conflict/vio-
lence.  
In the following, the state vision for LPCs and NKCs, and the per-
sonal attributes of committee members are discussed. 
State Vision Plan for LPCs
During the 1990s and the early part of the twenty-first century, local 
peace-building initiatives fostered in part by NGOs and faith-based or-
ganisations, and partially based on traditional clan structures, engaged 
successfully in conflict resolution. Notably, in Wajir in northern Kenya, a 
group of local women engaged local elders from warring Degodia and 
Ngare clans in a peacemaking process between 1990 and 1993 that helped 
to end violence between the groups (Menkhaus 2008). This experience 
partly informed the state, which in 2001 created a National Steering Com-
mittee on Peace-building and Conflict Management (NSC) to coordinate 
conciliatory activities in the country. The NSC brought together state and 
non-state actors, including key ministries, civil society organisations (for 
example, the National Council of Churches in Kenya; the Peace and De-
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Interior Ministry 
 
National Steering Committee (National Security Council, National Security 
Advisory Committee, development partners, NGOs, faith-based organisations) 
 
County Security Committee 
 
Sub-County Security Committee 
 
Ward Peace and Security Committee 
 
Location Peace and Secuity Committee 
 
Sub-Location Peace and Security Committee 
 
Local Peace Committee (village level) 
velopment Network), international organisations (Saferworld, Mercy Corps, 
etc.), and development partners (for example, USAID).15  
Figure 2. Kenya’s Devolved Peace and Security Institutions  
Source: Field data 2014.
In light of the decentralisation and delegation of conflict-mitigation re-
sponsibilities, the NSC created LPCs at the community/village level in 
an effort to integrate informal (traditional) conflict-resolution mechan-
isms with formal ones (for example, the courts). The chairs of the LPCs 
and chiefs, who are the “eyes” of the central government at the local 
level, form the sub-location (or location) peace and security committee, 
while chiefs and other state administrators at the ward level form the 
ward peace and security committee. The structure becomes increasingly 
bureaucratic at higher levels, as shown in Figure 2. Superficially, the 47 
counties in Kenya have relatively similar individual structures. Arguably, 
therefore, the NSC and the central government’s Ministry of Internal 
Security (the Interior Ministry) coordinate a rather amorphous peace and 
security framework. The interlinkages indicated by the arrows in Figure 2 
show intended synergies between committees, the right/authority to order/ 
control, and possible provisions of legitimacy.  
15  See the website of the NSC, <www.nscpeace.go.ke/about-us/membership.html>. 
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The following section describes the governance structure of LPCs 
in Enoosupukia Location, and thereafter that of NKCs in Maiella Sub-
location. 
Adapting LPCs to the Local Environment of 
Enoosupukia
Chiefs, in liaison with other government officials, usually call for a baraza16 
whenever there is a need to address community members and inform 
them about important matters affecting them. Some months after the 
2007–2008 post-election violence, the residents of Enoosupukia were 
called to a baraza to select members of the LPCs. During the baraza, 
county officials briefed villagers on the requirements of age, gender, and 
ethnicity for membership of the LPCs and facilitated the selection of 
members. The crowd then split into village groupings and each group 
selected a team of 11 LPC members. The LPCs henceforth exercised jur-
isdiction over their respective villages. 
The selection process was quite informal; villagers called out the 
names of possible candidates, and either supported or rejected the names 
by raising their hands without giving any reasons for their choice. There-
after, committees drawn from each village nominated a chair, a vice-
chair, and a secretary. There was no need for a treasurer because these 
committees did not handle any funds. Concerns over unclear village 
boundaries and jurisdictions did little to stop the selection process. A 
similar process was used to select LPCs in Maiella Sub-location.  
The number of people (11) constituting each committee is signifi-
cant. This odd number allows committee members to uphold or reject 
decisions (for instance, on a settlement or on the removal of a member 
from office) with almost no risk of a deadlocked vote. However, according 
to my observations, settlements seldom involve voting, and rarely will all 
committee members turn up for meetings. Usually, only the officials (chair, 
vice-chair, and secretary) are actively involved in the day-to-day affairs of 
the committee. 
LPCs in Enoosupukia have a very broad and somewhat vague port-
folio. Committee members noted that their roles included:  
1. preventing, managing, and resolving land and ethnic disputes; 
2. resolving inter-clan cattle rustling; 
16  Formal meetings attended by villagers, local administration, and representatives 
of the central government. 
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3. spearheading CP (surveillance); 
4. ensuring children (boys and girls) receive education, and reporting 
to the local administration for possible prosecution of any parents 
who discriminate based on gender in schooling;  
5. developing ways to end possible cases of early marriage and school 
dropouts;  
6. monitoring and reporting (to state agencies) the early warning signs of 
intra-/intergroup rivalry, as well as reporting politicians who preach 
ethnic essentialism through inflammatory statements; and 
7. monitoring development projects and reporting pertinent infrastruc-
tural and related needs to the local administration and higher offices.  
Table 1 shows the personal attributes of 33 LPC members drawn from the 
three villages in Enoosupukia. Each of these villages (Mpeuti, Olosho lole 
Kaloi, and Ol tepesi le Parsimei) has 11 LPC members. 
Table 1. Composition of Local Peace Committees in Enoosupukia,  
Narok County 
Variables N % 
Gender Male 22 66.7 Female 11 33.3 
Age 
30–40 13 39.4 
41–50 15 45.5 
51–60 2 6.1 
61 3 9.1 
Ethnicity 
Maasai 18 54.5 
Dorobo 7 21.2 
Nusu Nusu 6 18.2 
Kikuyu 2 6.1 
Education 
None 14 42.4 
Primary dropout 10 30.3 
Primary complete 7 21.2 
Secondary dropout 1 3.1 
Diploma 1 3.0 
Main sources of income* 
Livestock 23 69.7 
Leasing farmland 15 45.5 
Farming on own land 29 88.8 
Business 4 12.1 
* Under “Main sources of income,” the majority of committee members  
engaged in almost all mentioned livelihood activities. 
In stark contrast to indigenous judicial institutions, which were composed 
solely of male elders, the members of the LPCs include women and young 
people, as shown in Table 1 (at least one third). The state aims to main-
stream gender issues in conflict resolution by empowering women in the 
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area of peace-building and the long-term mitigation of conflict (Republic 
of Kenya 2011). Interestingly, elders (above 60) are rarely involved. In-
stead, males in their 30s and 40s are largely preferred as committee mem-
bers. However, a few elders above 60 years old are necessary because they 
possess the historical knowledge of land matters. They also pronounce 
curses by invoking supernatural powers to resolve difficult matters (dis-
cussed below).  
There is considerable ethnic diversity in the LPCs. However, and 
perhaps as might be expected, members of the dominant ethnic groups in 
a particular village predominate in the respective committees. Literacy is 
not a requirement for membership of a committee. Consequently, almost 
half of committee members are illiterate (42 per cent). Only a few have 
attended some introductory classes in formal education. Although im-
portant, conflict resolution through the application of local norms and 
values may not necessarily require skills acquired through formal educa-
tion. Nevertheless, almost all committee secretaries can read and write. 
They keep records of dispute resolution proceedings and of settlements.  
The majority of the committee members speak the local languages 
(Maa and Gikuyu) as well as Swahili. This enables the use of indigenous 
languages in dispute resolution, which encourages dialogue but does not 
guarantee settlements. Committee members subsist on several income-
generating activities. Almost all of them own land individually or through 
their families. The majority (about 90 per cent) engage in subsistence and 
small-scale commercial cultivation. A good number are landowners who 
lease farmland to tenants of Kikuyu descent. A large percentage (about 
70 per cent) own livestock in varying quantities, with the exception of 
women who, according to the patriarchal norms in Maasai society, rarely 
have ownership or disposal rights to land and livestock, unless they ac-
quired them mainly through purchase or as gifts. Committee members 
lamented that they used the returns from these activities to support their 
peace-building and surveillance roles. They called on the government to 
pay them salaries, to supply them with boda boda (motorbikes) for 
transport, and to cover relevant communication costs (mobile telephone 
airtime).  
State Vision Plan for Nyumba Kumi 
(Community Policing) 
Notably, the al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya in 2013 and 2014, and rising 
crime rates breathed a sense of urgency into the need for a new policing 
framework. Indeed, the president of Kenya himself lobbied for the 
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Nyumba Kumi idea as one that could redefine CP in Kenya. NK takes the 
smallest social unit (the household) as the starting point for surveillance. 
According to the Draft Guidelines for Implementation of Community 
Policing – Nyumba Kumi (Republic of Kenya 2015: 2), NK clusters do 
not necessarily involve 10 households (as the name might suggest); clusters 
may be in a residential court, in an estate, a block of houses, a manyatta 
(kraal), a street, a market centre, a gated community, or a village, and cut 
across divisions of creed, politics, ethnicity, gender, or any other sectarian 
affiliation. 
Kenya’s NK largely borrows from Tanzania’s socialism policy (vil-
lagisation, or Ujamaa) that was popular in the early 1970s (see Boesen, 
Madsen, and Moody 1977). In Tanzania’s settings, NK chairs (popularly 
known as “balozi wa kitongoji ”) monitored the day-to-day activities and in-
teractions of respective cluster members, recorded visitors, and served as 
custodians of local security. However, the concept declined in Tanzania, 
at least from the 1980s. Consequently, some members of the public have 
questioned whether the state might have been wise to borrow a more or 
less abandoned system from Tanzania in order to salvage an important 
security situation in Kenya.17 
Table 2. Nyumba Kumi Roles 
– resolve boundary disputes – promote cluster security education 
– devise methods to promote Jua Jirani 
Yako (“Know Your Neighbour”) 
– develop ways of improving safety of 
passengers 
– resolve watering point disputes – identify and monitor social develop-
ment activities 
– resolve access to watering points and 
grazing disputes 
– monitor and evaluate local economic 
activities 
– develop ways of improving the envi-
ronment (e.g. street/building lighting) 
– carry out local crime mapping 
– resolve interethnic cattle rustling – assess and evaluate poverty, health 
needs, and employment levels of 
cluster members 
– resolve known ethnic differences – recommend day-to-day security 
actions 
– develop a system of identification of 
aliens 
– manage jigger and other vector-based 
infestations 
– develop a system of identifying hotel 
patrons 
– monitor safety of forests 
– develop a system of identifying 
tenants 
– promote better education standards 
17  Brainstorm, Interrogating the Nyumba Kumi Initiative, 26 November 2013.  
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The state proposed that the following members should constitute each 
NK unit/cluster: three members of the public (considering ethnic bal-
ancing, age, gender); a representative from each religion in a cluster; a 
businessperson; a county government representative; a youth; a woman; 
the area assistant chief, and a representative from each government po-
licing agency with a presence in a cluster/locality (Republic of Kenya 
2015: 8). In practice, however, none of the NK has a government po-
licing agent as a member, as shown below. Arguably, little has been done 
to resolve existing mistrust between the police and the public to warrant 
a collaborative framework. Moreover, clusters are taken as homogeneous 
and coherent entities. 
Just like the LPCs, the NKCs are at the bottom of Kenya’s devolved 
CP structure. At the helm (the national level) is the Interior Ministry and 
the NSC. Figure 3 illustrates Kenya’s devolved CP structure. The chairs of 
the NKCs and chiefs form the sub-location CP committee, which links the 
local level to the formal security apparatus in the ward, sub-county, county, 
and the state. The interlinkages (indicated by arrows) show the proposed 
sharing of security information, the level of authority, and the intended 
cooperation in attending to security matters.  
Figure 3. Kenya’s Devolved Community Policing Structure  
Source: Modified from Republic of Kenya 2015. 
The Draft Guidelines for Implementation of Community Policing (Repub-
lic of Kenya 2015) proposed numerous roles for the NKCs. As shown in 
Table 2, the list is more about “what to do” and less about “how to do” it.  
There is a massive duplication of roles between the NKCs and the 
LPCs. Consequently, their mandates are conflated at the local level. This 
Interior Ministry 
 
National Steering Committee 
 
Sub-County Monitoring and Evaluation Committee 
 
Ward Community Policing Committee 
 
Sub-Location/Location Community Policing Committee 
 
Nyumba Kumi Committee (cluster level) 
(example of committee members: 2 women, 2 youth, 3 men) 
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merging of mandates risks creating possible clashes over jurisdiction, and 
has resulted in the absorption/replacement of one system by the other, 
as exemplified below.  
Adapting the NKCs to the
Local Context of Maiella 
In a bid to adapt NKCs to specific local situations, the villagers and the 
local administration of Maiella Sub-location selected seven community 
members from each village to form NKCs, taking each village as an 
independent cluster. In the end, they selected 14 NKCs, equivalent to 
the villages that were already governed by LPCs. The selection of the 
members of the NKCs resembled that of the LPCs and was conducted 
sometime in 2013. As noted earlier, none of the NKCs has a government 
policing agent as a member. However, individual committees make an 
effort to cooperate with the police where necessary, as exemplified in the 
last part of the paper.  
Table 3. Composition of Nyumba Kumi Committees in  
Maiella Sub-Location, Nakuru County  
Variables N % 
Gender Male 16 76.2 Female 5 23.8 
Age 
20–40 11 52.4 
41–50 7 33.3 
51–60 3 14.3 
61 0 0 
Ethnicity 
Maasai 7 33.3 
Kikuyu 13 62.0 
Kamba 1 4.7 
Education 
None 8 38 
Primary dropout 5 23.8 
Primary complete 5 23.8 
Secondary complete 3 14.4 
Diploma 0 0 
Main sources of income 
Livestock 5 23.8 
Farming on rented land 8 38.0 
Business 6 28.6 
Casual work 2 9.52 
 
Table 3 shows the personal attributes of the members of three NKCs in 
Maiella Sub-location. The three villages (clusters) include Maiella Trading 
Centre, Kokoti, and Nkampani. Notably, the governance structure of the 
 20 Eric Mutisya Kioko 
NKCs is quite similar to that of the LPCs in Enoosupukia except for the 
fact that each NKC has seven members. As shown in Table 3, NKCs 
have considerable ethnic, gender, and age diversity. Just like the LPCs, 
the villagers preferred people under the age of 40 years to represent 
them as members of the respective committees, and did not include 
elders above the age of 60. Moreover, the majority of the committee 
members have completed primary school. The cultivation of land leased 
from Maa-speaking landowners in Enoosupukia and business are the 
primary sources of income for the majority of NKC members from 
Maiella Sub-location.  
Comparatively, there is a marked difference in the ethnic composition 
of the LPCs and NKCs in Enoosupukia Location versus in Maiella Sub-
location; this reflects the varying ethnic composition of the overall popula-
tion in the two locations (Tables 1 and 3, respectively).  
Conflated Roles and the Constraints of the 
Hybrid Governance Arrangement 
In principle, cluster members should report possible crimes and security 
concerns to their respective LPCs or NKCs, which are then tasked with 
either dealing with the alleged offenders or, alternatively, passing the 
information on to government security agencies (chiefs, police) at the 
locational level. However, what constitutes a “crime” is unclear to many. 
It is difficult to tell whether an “alien” is a genuine visitor, or someone 
who is in the area to commit a crime. Furthermore, corrupt state officials 
might arguably “assist” certain criminals. The informants in this study 
noted that rogue police officers use security information reported by 
NKCs (and by LPCs) to enrich themselves. In one incident, rogue police 
personnel dropped a case against an alleged al-Shabaab sympathiser for 
“lack of evidence,” while in fact, they had dropped the charges after 
obtaining a bribe from the person in question. Informants shared similar 
narratives involving the sale of illicit alcohol, among other crimes. Such 
corruption may not be the fault of the hybrid governance arrangements 
per se; it is also nested in both the formal and informal sectors. But such 
incidents have increasingly reduced the willingness of NKCs to engage in 
surveillance activities. Consequently, NKCs focus on dispute resolution 
through arbitration, a role supposed to be played by the LPCs. 
In Maiella Trading Centre, the NKC regulates the sale and consump-
tion of alcohol according to the Alcoholic Drinks Control Act of 2010 
(clubs do not open earlier than 5 p.m.). However, some bar owners have 
found ways to manipulate the system in order to do business throughout 
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the day. Some lock their customers inside the bars in the day, while others 
sell beer from their homes. The NKC also monitors the livestock trade by 
collaborating with traders (butchers, brokers, and so on) to prevent trading 
in stolen livestock. Nowadays, livestock traders must adhere to operational 
rules, which prohibit the purchase of livestock from strangers, but some 
break these rules anyway.  
Notably, the institutional arrangement of Kenya’s devolved peace 
and security frameworks (Figures 2 and 3) is quite abstract, ambiguous, 
and bureaucratic. There is obvious complexity of governance. While the 
primary objective of the system is to increase state presence and effect-
iveness locally, such control of local environments could eventually mean 
co-option and/or marginalisation of actors at the community level.  
The paradox of the duplication of the roles of the NKCs and LPCs 
has resulted in the absorption of one system by the other in the study 
area. In Enoosupukia, Narok County, there is little effort to implement 
NK as an independent institution. Instead, the LPCs in this Maasai-
dominated area are increasingly taking on NK roles. In a group meeting 
with the LPC members of Mpeuti, the chair insisted that his team was 
spearheading crime surveillance and arbitrating in local disputes. Ac-
cording to my observations, LPCs in Enoosupukia have implemented 
the Jua Jirani Yako (“Know Your Neighbour”) campaign, which is one 
facet of surveillance. Committee members ensure that landowners probe 
for information and identification documents from land-seeking clients 
before leasing land. Landowners insist on knowing some background 
information about their potential clients (for instance, place of birth, the 
names of members of their extended family, friends and/or family in the 
study area, marital status, and knowledge of Maa, Gikuyu, or Swahili). 
They then report any suspicious cases to their LPCs, chief, or police. 
While in Enoosupukia the LPCs have taken up NK roles, the situa-
tion is different in Maiella Sub-location. Here, NKCs are increasingly re-
placing LPCs, whose effect has progressively diminished, at least since 
2014. Indeed, since 2014, cases that relate to NKCs dominate the records 
stored at the chief’s office in Maiella, while prior to the implementation of 
the NK records pertaining to LPCs had dominated. In a recent baraza at 
Maiella Trading Centre, the NKCs called on government officials to scrap 
LPCs because of the possible clash of mandate. The county officials inter-
viewed attributed the strength of the NK in the area to their county com-
missioner’s (county security chief) efforts to incorporate these systems into 
the county’s peace and security sector.  
As noted earlier, Kenya’s endemic corruption problem is finding its 
way into the hybrid security and peace-building arrangement, where some 
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police officers profit from security information (intelligence reports) 
shared by NKCs and LPCs. Corruption is not limited to state officials, 
however. Usually, disputants tend to “reward” LPCs and NKCs with some 
money or food during or after arbitration proceedings. Locals call this, 
“cooking for wazee [‘elders’].” This practice is reminiscent of the food 
and/or beer that villagers customarily served the council of elders in the 
nineteenth century during arbitration proceedings. I have observed, how-
ever, that the practice can influence committee decisions and interfere with 
the outcome of a settlement. Villagers noted that such transaction costs are 
low compared to the time and money spent when disputants record their 
complaints with the chief, police, or courts. Both formal and informal 
mechanisms are also vulnerable to political manipulation. Committee 
members feared that politicians might use them to further political agendas 
or to recruit voters.  
The legitimacy question is equally important. Often disputants choose 
between the LPCs and NKCs to record a complaint. The LPCs consider 
themselves superior to the NKCs, and vice versa. The LPCs believe their 
neo-traditional sanctioning methods to be akin to those applied by coun-
cils of elders, whose expediency is still reflected at the local level. The 
NKCs weigh their legitimacy against the broader goal of national security, 
with which they are associated, and thus boast state support. Such power 
struggles invariably shape interactions between actors but rarely play out in 
the open.  
Conflicts between formal law and informal rules in the definition of 
crime and the administration of justice already threaten the hybrid ar-
rangement. For instance, while LPCs may consider hand-written docu-
ments or word of mouth as proof of ownership of land, courts usually 
consider only title deeds. Increasingly, community members are learning 
to exploit such weaknesses. Moreover, crimes such as wife battering are 
accorded little weight, especially in the Maasai culture, where patriarchy 
has a great impact on gender relations. Despite the recently enacted 
Protection Against Domestic Violence Act, 2015, some LPCs still dis-
missed women who reported domestic violence. Last, neighbourhood 
surveillance, according to some informants, contravenes their constitu-
tional right to privacy. In the cases observed, some villagers expressed 
their dissatisfaction when asked to account for their visitors and to share 
information about individual household members with LPCs or NKCs.  
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Dispute Resolution at the Local Level
Community members prefer to resolve disputes at the community level 
(informal level). Participants here are mainly neighbours and their affili-
ates (friends and kin). Nowadays, an LPC or NKC will guide the process. 
At this level, the settlement of disputes is often fast (instant justice) and 
involves lower transaction costs. It is also often positive-sum rather than 
zero-sum. Moreover, conflict resolution largely adheres to local norms 
and values. The need to restore and sustain peaceful relations between 
neighbours enhances the legitimacy of local mechanisms.  
However, disputants are free to record their complaints with formal 
institutions, like the area chief, the police, or the courts, particularly if 
they question the credibility of the LPCs or NKCs, when local arbitra-
tion fails, or when a dispute is particularly difficult (lacks evidence or in-
volves contested evidence). LPCs and NKCs often engage security agen-
cies in situations that threaten to deteriorate into violent conflict. When 
disputants bypass their LPCs or NKCs and choose to record their com-
plaints with the chiefs or the police directly, the latter can handle the 
matter alone, choose to involve the necessary LPC or NKC, or refer the 
matter back to the respective LPC or NKC. The case is usually referred 
back to the LPC or NKC when it involves traditions. Furthermore, the 
chiefs or the police can also refer the case to higher offices if necessary, 
but disputants may decide to drop their charges for fear of mounting 
transaction costs when a case escalates to formal institutions. Moreover, 
formal mechanisms often have little concern for the social implications 
of a decision or settlement.  
I have found no evidence that the NKCs and LPCs have procedural 
rules for bringing conflicting parties to an agreement, for resolving a 
matter of dispute, or for carrying out surveillance. Instead, some com-
mittees innovate ways they deem appropriate depending on the situation, 
need, context, and the parties involved. They also create by-laws, draw-
ing on experiences from day-to-day situations, and as directed by gov-
ernment officials (see case study). 
Irrespective of the institution, there is no guarantee that a binding 
settlement will be established. Compromises based on ideas of good 
neighbourliness may not prevent a similar or related dispute. The LPCs 
in Maasai society invoke the supernatural power of engai (God) through 
curses to enforce settlements where necessary. The curses involve per-
suading supernatural powers to punish offenders with misfortunes. 
These may manifest in the form of illness, death, miscarriage, or infertil-
ity of livestock or persons. LPCs usually warn offenders that they may be 
cursed if they fail to adhere to a settlement agreement. Such individuals 
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may include suspected robbers and individuals that the villagers accuse 
of immorality. Kikuyu tenants who live in Maasai villages, and Kikuyu 
women who have married Maasai spouses fall under the jurisdiction of 
the LPCs of those villages. They, too, respect the curse. Apart from the 
committee elders, the only other people who can pronounce curses are 
male youths, but they can only do this in relation to offences committed 
by their peers or by those in an age category younger than their own. 
Arguably, the Maasai society is increasingly integrating LPCs into its 
belief systems and age organisation.  
The final part of this paper presents an example of how a herder–
farmer dispute was handled at the local level.  
Case Study: Cattle in “Prison” 
John, a Kikuyu farmer, rented five acres of land from a Maasai in Olosho 
lole Kaloi village in 2007. He successfully negotiated with his landlord to 
settle on the farm. Since then, John has practised subsistence and com-
mercial agriculture.  
One Sunday in March 2014, a herd of almost 100 cattle strayed onto 
John’s farm and destroyed four acres of his maize plantation. The cattle 
belonged to Peter, a Maasai resident of Olosho lole Kaloi village. John 
was returning home from church when he saw the animals on his farm. 
He ran fast to drive them away, but on noticing the damage they had 
caused, he decided to drive the cattle to the Maiella police station at 
Maiella Trading Centre. The boys who were herding Peter’s cattle failed 
to persuade John to reconsider this decision.  
The large herd attracted the attention of a good number of villagers 
(both Maasai and Kikuyu), the majority of whom were also returning 
home from church. By looking at the pattern of ear notching, some 
Maasai youths identified the cattle as belonging to Peter. John did not 
answer their curious questions. By the time he had arrived at the police 
station, a group of Kikuyu friends had joined him, while another group 
of curious Maasai followed at a distance. There was a near “clash” at the 
gate of the police station as the Maasai tried to persuade John to consult 
Peter before recording his complaint with the police. A police officer 
quickly unlocked the gate and allowed John to move “his” herd to an 
open space inside the compound. “Nothing is left of my crops!” he 
complained.  
“Are there no wazee [referring to the LPC] in your village who can 
handle this matter?” asked Senior (the senior police officer). John, who 
perhaps did not expect the question, remained silent. A short while later, a 
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few LPC members from the village where John farms arrived at the police 
station, having heard about the incident from Peter, who had reached out 
to them as soon as his herding boys told him what had happened.  
The LPC officials headed straight to the police desk, cutting through 
the curious crowd. “Peter informed us about this matter,” the LPC chair 
told the police official. “We could not mobilise all the LPC members be-
cause some are still in church. We decided to come here to assist.”  
“Did you assess the loss reported by him?” asked Senior, pointing at 
John. After a brief silence (perhaps an indication that the LPC had not 
done so), Senior continued, “Go back, assess the damage and then come 
back with a report.”  
The LPC chair notified Peter about developments and asked him to 
meet them at John’s farm. By 6 p.m. that evening, the LPC had reported 
their observations at the police station. At the same time, John’s follow-
ers were busy advising him on how to go about claiming compensation, 
some quoting large sums of money. 
“This is a dispute between neighbours and can be handled at ‘home’ 
with the help of the LPC,” said the chair of the LPC. “There was no 
need for John to drive a hundred cattle to the police. He should have 
raised his complaint with his LPC first. We request you [police] to refer 
this matter back ‘home’ so that we can try to resolve it.”  
John, together with a few of his followers who were keenly follow-
ing the discussion, left unannounced when the police granted this re-
quest. Senior asked an LPC representative to ascertain the number of 
cattle – there were 80 – and said, “The cattle will spend the night here 
with us. In the meantime, go back home and deal with this case.” The 
LPC and supporters from the Maasai community left the police station 
around 8 p.m. for their homes in Olosho lole Kaloi village. The LPC 
members decided to pass by Peter’s home to update him on the situa-
tion. A new development, however, confronted them upon their arrival.  
John was already at Peter’s home with a contingent of LPC members 
from the neighbouring villages of Mpeuti, Nkampani, Ol tepesi le Par-
simei, and Range. Apparently, John’s purpose in leaving the police station 
unannounced was to solicit as many followers as possible to amass the 
influence necessary to add weight to his complaint. The introduction of 
new supporters, LPCs, or NKCs of interest also happens when a matter of 
dispute traverses several villages, as in this case. 
Twenty-eight LPC members of Maasai descent along with John’s 
Kikuyu followers had gathered at Peter’s home, perhaps anticipating the 
arrival of Peter’s LPC supporters. John had already lamented to them 
that the police had not shown sufficient interest with regard to such a 
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crucial matter – one that could trigger intergroup “clashes.” After a brief 
deliberation, the LPC members made a unanimous decision to discuss 
the matter first thing the following day, after which they scattered in 
small groups to their respective villages for the night.  
The case resumed early the following morning at Peter’s home. The 
disputants and their associates (about 10 friends and relatives from each 
side), along with the 11 LPC members of Olosho lole Kaloi village, eight 
LPC members from Range village, four LPC members from Mpeuti vil-
lage, 10 LPC members from Ol tepesi le Parsimei village, and six Nyumba 
Kumi members from Nkampani village attended the meeting. It was very 
clear to all that a settlement was necessary and urgent in order to end the 
tension that was building on both sides of the divide.  
A short break in the hearing before determining the matter of dispute 
in the study area allowed the disputants to consult widely with their fol-
lowers – notably, about compensation and/or the social effects of the 
dispute. The LPC members already expected John to propose financial 
compensation. Rarely does an LPC enforce a settlement. Instead, the com-
mittee provides an opportunity for dialogue between the disputants and 
allows them enough time to consult their followers. Such dialogue may 
lead to one of two scenarios, as follows. 
First, a plaintiff may propose some form of compensation (usually 
money) beyond the defendant’s expectations. In this case, a defendant will 
propose a counter-offer, and a series of negotiations follow. The LPC 
members intervene only to impose order where necessary or to remind 
disputants about the value of good neighbourliness, often emphasising the 
need for a mutual agreement.  
However, the failure to reach a settlement derails the process, perhaps 
even prompting a further postponement, leading to the second scenario. 
At this point, the LPCs may invite experts – for instance, in this case, the 
area agricultural officer – to assess and value the crops damaged.  
Usually, the agricultural officer will accompany disputants, together 
with the concerned LPC or NKC members, to make a manual count of 
the damaged crops. Where manual counts are not feasible, they estimate 
the loss in terms of crop acreage using the prevailing market rate, which 
is then discussed as a settlement. Should early warning signals of violence 
or actual “clashes” appear, the committee would immediately seek the 
intervention of security agencies. Such signs may include verbal ex-
changes, fights, or threats. Additional parties to a dispute often introduce 
further transaction costs (money, time, etc.). However, if a plaintiff pro-
poses an amount that is satisfactory to the defendant, the matter is soon 
concluded.  
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In the case described here, to the surprise of the defendant and his 
followers, John demanded only KES 16,000 (EUR 160) as compensa-
tion, which was lower than they had anticipated. Despite the damage 
caused to the crops, John could still salvage some maize cobs for food. 
However, his brief speech shed light on the compromise. He said, “We 
should be more careful with our livestock and caution the boys herding 
them. We are neighbours in this village […] today it was my farm, 
tomorrow it will be that of another person.”  
Indeed, John was deliberately appealing to the LPC members whose 
authority he had overlooked the previous day. His speech confirmed that 
he had re-evaluated his position as a tenant and acknowledged that loy-
alty was demanded of him by his landlord and the villagers. The defend-
ant’s side welcomed John’s gesture, and Peter was ready to pay the com-
pensation, thus resolving the dispute.  
Financial compensation, though popular among the Kikuyu com-
munity, has little weight among the Maasai. In most cases, the Maasai 
accept livestock (usually female) as compensation in dispute settlements. 
Livestock, they argue, symbolises the reunification of disputants by the 
blood of the animals, and villagers interpret their reproduction as signi-
fying long-term friendship between disputants. Money, they argue, cre-
ates a weak bond, which may last only until it is spent. Generally, how-
ever, compensation involves both livestock and money. The Maasai have 
increasingly influenced the Kikuyu towards this form of settlement. In 
the current case, however, there was no exchange of livestock.  
Later, committee members reported the settlement to the police for 
the release of the cattle. Peter paid John in the presence of the police and 
LPC members, thereby legitimising the settlement. The police then asked 
John to pay KES 8,000 (EUR 80) so that they could “close his case file.” 
He complied, aware that this was a bribe. The LPC members were de-
lighted because such a transaction cost served to caution other villagers 
against recording complaints with formal institutions. However, transac-
tion costs may not deter some disputants from seeking an audience with 
formal institutions. Some use their own resources, others take advantage 
of social-political connections, while yet others may consolidate them-
selves and/or their resources and use collective action to their advantage.  
Later that week, the LPC drew important lessons from John’s case 
and developed several by-laws, which they later communicated to com-
munity members in a baraza. Below is a translation of the by-laws: 
1. When livestock stray onto farms, tenants should not take the ani-
mals to the police station. Instead, they should look for an LPC 
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member to record their complaint. Taking livestock to the police can 
trigger conflicts between herders and farmers. 
2. Herders are advised to take care of their livestock so that they do 
not stray onto crop farms.  
3. Landowners leasing farmland to tenants should assess the tenants’ 
identification documents and backgrounds to ensure that they do 
not deal with criminals. 
In terms of hybridity, the case demonstrates the appreciation and inter-
action of state and non-state actors (namely, the police and LPC mem-
bers) in resolving a dispute, where the police concerned recognised the 
legitimacy of indigenous judicial institutions. Despite the presence of 
other committee members from neighbouring clusters, only one LPC 
(from the affected village) took charge of the arbitration process, while 
NKC members and other participants mainly followed the proceedings 
as observers and witnesses. Such a presence, however, is necessary for 
sanctioning settlements and agreements. 
Conclusion  
Though popular in development discourses, governance of natural re-
sources, and conflict resolution/peace-building for being flexible and 
effective, this paper shows that hybrid governance arrangements are 
imbued with complexities and constraints that mainly reflect the opera-
tional nature of hybrids. Borys and Jemison (1989: 236) argue that “unit-
ing around a common purpose [what hybrid systems propose to achieve] 
is only part of the story; the hybrid must also find a way to achieve that 
purpose.” They single out the reconciliation of heterogeneous actors and 
operations as a central problem for hybrids. In the Kenyan context, this 
problem starts at the local level, where the rampant politicisation of land 
and ethnic categories creates divisions between groups, informing the 
creation of ethnic cleavages in the control and protection of land and 
other resources.  
The paper notes that local peace committees and Nyumba Kumi 
committees, as part of hybrid arrangements with the formal security sector, 
provide some hope in resolving local-level disputes through the applica-
tion of local norms and values. Initially, the two neo-traditional institutions 
had two different mandates – LPCs were mainly meant to solve local dis-
putes through arbitration, while NKCs were thought of as measures for 
local surveillance. As shown in the discussion, however, these two differ-
ent mandates are increasingly conflated at the local level, creating a situa-
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tion where NKCs and LPCs absorb and/or replace one another and their 
roles. There is no certainty about how both institutions can operate in a 
particular cluster/village, although the Draft Guidelines (Republic of 
Kenya 2015: 3) vaguely note that Nyumba Kumi is a replacement neither 
for village elders nor for peace committees. Notably, dispute resolution 
and local surveillance are almost synonymous in the local context. Indeed, 
some informants hoped that the state would officially combine LPCs and 
NKCs into one body that can henceforth exercise jurisdiction at the grass-
roots level.  
Irrespective of the clash of mandates and consequent absorption of 
one system by the other (LPCs by NKCs or vice versa), arbitration by 
LPCs and NKCs considers the social implications of both a given settle-
ment and the matters in dispute. The intention is often to ensure that 
disputants continue living as good neighbours, although one cannot 
guarantee such a continuation of friendship. Dispute resolution at the 
community level often takes relatively less time (instant justice) than 
pursuing the matter (in dispute) through the formal judicial system, 
where transaction costs (time and money) may be higher. At the com-
munity level, dispute settlement is often positive-sum rather than zero-
sum. There are instances where small-scale disputes between two neigh-
bours can transform in scale and become more complicated. The resolu-
tion process can therefore take days, weeks, months, or even years. For 
instance, one particular dispute relating to the sale of land in 1974 be-
tween a Kikuyu buyer and a Maasai seller is persisting now four decades 
on. Nevertheless, the virtues of good neighbourliness and compromise 
contribute to binding settlements in most observed cases, although the 
repeat of a dispute is often inevitable. Notwithstanding the lack of ca-
pacity to enforce settlements, some LPCs and NKCs invoke supernatural 
powers or engai through the use of curses to enforce agreements. Re-
course to supernatural forces in dispute resolution is considered locally 
to be more effective than the formal instruments of the state apparatus.  
The term “hybrid” indicates the different sources of authority (or dif-
ferent modes of operation) of state and non-state security provid-
ers/institutions working in parallel. How they interact is subject to local 
balances of power and empirical legitimacy, which provides the broad label 
of “hybrid” with only limited analytical value. This also means that making 
a decontextualised general assessment of the effectiveness of hybrid secur-
ity arrangements is impossible. 
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Konfliktlösung und Kriminalitätsprävention in Kenia:  
Lokale Friedenskomitees und Nyumba Kumi 
Zusammenfassung: Nach zahlreichen interethnischen Zusammenstößen 
und terroristischen Angriffen von al-Shabaab in den letzten Jahren hat der 
kenianische Staat Sicherheitsfunktionen auf die kommunale Ebene verla-
gert. Rechte zur Beilegung lokaler Konflikte und zur Verhütung von Straf-
taten wurden lokalen Friedenskomitees übertragen – ein Versuch, gewohn-
heitsrechtliche Verfahren zu standardisieren –, sowie Nyumba-Kumi-Ko-
mitees, mit denen Kommunalpolitik auf der Ebene der Haushalte veran-
kert werden soll. Den politischen Hintergrund dafür bilden generelle Pläne 
zur Dezentralisierung und zur Verlagerung staatlicher Funktionen auf die 
kommunale Ebene. Der Autor des Beitrags stellt folgende Fragen: Sind 
hybride Formen der Ausübung staatlicher Funktionen effizient und ange-
messen? Inwieweit fördern lokale Friedens- und Nyumba-Kumi-Komitees 
die friedliche Lösung von Konflikten und die Verbrechensbekämpfung in 
Kenia? Wie kann ein Erfolg ihrer Arbeit gesichert werden beziehungsweise 
was könnte den Erfolg gefährden? Grundlage der Analyse ist eine eth-
nographische Erhebung im Maasai-Kikuyu-Grenzgebiet in der Nähe des 
Naivasha-Sees, einem früheren Brennpunkt interethnischer Auseinander-
setzungen. 
Schlagwörter: Kenia, Konfliktlösung, Verbrechensbekämpfung, Dezen-
tralisierung, Gemeinde, Kommunale Institution/Einrichtung 
 
